Súčasné
problémy Islandu tkvejú v agresívnom rozmachu bánk a reálnymi úsporami
nepodloženom ekonomickom raste stimulovanom rozsiahlym zadlžovaním tak
firemného sektora ako aj domácností. Aktíva Islandských bánk vzrástli od roku 2000,
keď nedosahovali ani úroveň HDP, na viac ako desaťnásobok. Zadĺženie
islandských domácností presahuje HDP a v roku 2003
dosahovalo 175% ich disponibilného príjmu. Zadlženie firiem dosahovalo už v roku 2001
140% HDP.
Islandský HDP poklesol v prvom štvrťroku o 4%
oproti predchádzajúcemu štvrťroku.Hrubý
krátkodobý zahraničný dlh presahoval 15 násobok devízových rezerv (200% HDP)
v roku 2007, hrubý dlhodobý zahraničný dlh dosahoval ďalších 350% HDP.
Tieto
ohromné čísla umožnili rozsiahlu akvizičnú politiku islandských podnikov (najbližšie od nás kupovali Islanďania paštikárov Hamé
Babice).
Ako k tejto expanzii došlo?
Vývoj popisuje nižšie uvedený text zverejnený vo Financial
Times, ktorý sme voľne preložili a skrátili do bodov:
1) Vláda
vlastní banky a znižuje úroky na negatívnu úroveň. Poskytuje úvery
spriateleným firmám, a nepriamo podporuje neefektívnu alokáciu zdrojov
2) V roku
2000 sú banky náhle privatizované spriatelenými firmami, vedenie ministerstva
financií a centrálnej banky je v rukách ľudí akceptujúcich akékoľvek
riziko
3) Pôvodne
retailové banky sa menia na investičné,
začína nekontrolovateľné bujnenie, financované zahraničným dlhom, nie
domácimi úsporami
4) Centrálna
banka prestala kontrolovať rezervy bánk
5) Banky
zarábali na požičiavaní si krátkych peňazí, ktorými financovali dlhodobé
projekty
6) Pokles
dôvery na finančných trhoch zavrel kohútiky a islandské banky nechce
v tejto rulete nikto podporovať
How could such a minnow exercise so much leverage? The answer starts before
2000, when most of the banks were still publicly owned and run like government
departments. Real interest rates were low and even negative for long periods.
Facing excess demand for credit, the banks operated like political patrons,
allocating credit to favoured business clients. The resulting inefficiencies in
resource allocation were offset by ever-rising amounts of debt relative to
equity and by the longest hours of work in western Europe. These factors helped
Iceland to become one of the most prosperous countries in the world in terms of
per capita income and several indicators of quality of life.
The banks were privatised around 2000 in a hasty and politically driven
process. Ownership went to people with close connections to the parties in the
conservative coalition government, which had scant experience in modern
banking. The central bank and the finance ministry were staffed at the top by
people who preferred as light a regulatory touch as possible.
The banks soon extended their operations from commercial banking to
investment banking. Neither they nor the regulators separated the implicit
guarantees they received as commercial banks from their operations as
investment banks. The extension of the safety net allowed them to take big bets
at home and abroad. They operated like hedge funds, financing their expansion
largely from foreign borrowings rather than domestic deposits.
The central bank tied its own hands so as to leave only the interest rate as
its control instrument. It gave up reserve requirements on grounds that the
banks did not want them; and it also failed to exercise moral suasion. Its
efforts to restrain inflation by raising short-term rates (to 15 per cent by
2008) had the effect of sucking in more “carry trade” capital, undermining the
intended curbing of demand and leading the krona to appreciate despite the huge
external deficit.
During the 2000s, Icelandic companies and households have taken to borrowing
as though there is no tomorrow. Now Iceland’s external liabilities swamp the
central bank’s ability to act as lender of last resort, and other Nordic
central banks have felt obliged to offer support
lest an Icelandic implosion blow a hole in their own banking systems.
The “great unwind” currently under way is the result of the excesses built
up in this framework of light regulation – itself the product of hasty, though
overdue, privatisation. Now the new coalition government itself is in deep
trouble. Rumours swirl that the second largest party, the Social Democrats,
which came into government in the elections of May 2007 for the first time in
14 years, may end its coalition with the biggest party, the conservative
Independence party, precipitating new elections. Opinion polls suggest that the
Independence party would be likely to suffer a big loss and the Social
Democratic party, its reputation less tarnished by the financial crisis, could
get enough support to form a new government with one of the smaller parties.
That could signal a welcome change of direction in Iceland’s economic policy
towards a more Scandinavian model, where finance does not rule the economy and
macroeconomic imbalances are taken seriously.
The writer is professor of political economy at
the London School of Economics and winner of the Leontief Prize in economics,
2008
